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3.1  Introduction 
At least since the time of Adam Smith, economists have viewed the 
employment relation as a transaction in several dimensions, with em- 
ployers and employees embodying multiple characteristics of interest to 
each other, and with the allocation of workers and wages across jobs the 
result of  implicit markets for those characteristics.’ Only recently, how- 
ever, have economists begun to estimate the structural parameters of 
these implicit markets for characteristics. Although the labor economics 
literature contains a long line of  empirical work relating differences in 
wages to differences in worker and job attributes, as yet there have been 
few attempts to go beyond these “hedonic” descriptions of labor market 
outcomes and estimate the underlying structural demand and supply 
functions for characteristics that generate these outcomes.* 
To some extent, this scarcity of structural analyses may be attributable 
to lags in the development of the appropriate theory and meth~dology.~ 
Such lags, however, cannot completely explain this scarcity, for several 
studies that are analogous in nature have now appeared in other fields, 
particularly in the field of  urban  economic^.^ It is more likely that the 
relative scarcity of  structural hedonic studies of the labor market stems 
from the generally inconclusive results obtained by researchers who have 
estimated compensating wage differentials for various job or worker 
characteristics. Although these researchers have repeatedly found evi- 
dence consistent with the presence of compensating wage differentials for 
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jobs requiring additional schooling or postschool training, attempts to 
estimate compensating differentials related to other characteristics of the 
job-worker match have generated less clear-cut results? In contrast, re- 
searchers in the field of urban economics, for example, have consistently 
found evidence of  negative housing price differentials associated with 
air pollution, and estimates of these differentials have served as a basis 
for several “structural” analyses of the demand for clean air.6 
The estimation of  compensating differentials that have appropriate 
signs is clearly a convenient starting point, if  not a necessary condition, 
for the estimation of a market structure that might have generated those 
differences. Given the weak and varied nature of  the wage differentials 
estimated so far, it  is  therefore not  surprising that so few structural 
hedonic analyses of labor market data have been carried out. Neverthe- 
less, with future improvements in the accuracy and completeness with 
which total compensation and job and worker attributes are measured, 
one might reasonably hope that more “believable” differentials will yet 
be found. Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect more structural 
hedonic analyses of labor market  data to appear in  the future. This 
expectation seems especially well justified, moreover, when one consid- 
ers the many policy issues that require information about market struc- 
ture for their resolution.’ 
Given the very likely appearance of more structural hedonic analyses 
of  labor market data in the future, the very limited appearance of  such 
analyses in the past, the growing experience with analogous studies in 
other fields, and the importance of  correct methodology in such applica- 
tions, some assessment of  the experience to date with structural estima- 
tion in hedonic price models appears worthwhile. This paper is intended 
to contribute to that assessment. 
The general focus of this paper centers on the conditions under which 
one can  estimate the structural equations that generate  an observed 
hedonic price locus, as well as the methods one might use to do so. The 
more specific focus of this paper centers on the two-stage procedure for 
estimating structural equations in implicit markets that was first sug- 
gested by Rosen (1974).8  The paper begins with a brief summary of  this 
empirical procedure and notes that, although the procedure has now 
been applied by  several researchers, there appears as yet to be only 
limited recognition of  the restricted set of  conditions under which this 
method actually will yield estimates of  structural parameters. 
In developing this point, the paper discusses three related subjects that 
seem to have received insufficient explicit attention in the past. The first 
of these subjects concerns the use of “constructed” marginal prices in the 
estimation of structural equations for markets in which no direct observa- 
tions on marginal prices are available. Contrary to suggestions originally 
made by Rosen (1974), and also by Freeman (1974), it is argued here that 
the use of such constructed marginal prices may have fundamental effects 125  Structural Estimation in Implicit Markets 
on  the identification of structural equations and on the statistical methods 
required for consistent estimation of  structural parameters in implicit 
markets. 
The second subject addressed in this paper concerns the behavioral 
endogeneity of  marginal attribute prices at the level of  the individual 
market participant and the special data requirements implied by this 
endogeneity. Contrary to recent assertions by some authors, it is argued 
here that structural parameters can be estimated using data from a single 
implicit market. However, it is also argued that, holding constant the 
number of  observations, data from several markets will generally be 
preferable to data from a single implicit market. 
The third subject addressed in this paper concerns the potential prob- 
lems and consequences of  specification error that are peculiar to struc- 
tural estimation in implicit markets. The general conclusion of  this sec- 
tion and, indeed, of  the paper as a whole is that, while the two-stage 
procedure  suggested  by  Rosen  may  provide  consistent  estimates of 
structural parameters in implicit markets, estimates based on this proce- 
dure should be viewed with particular caution. 
3.2  The Two-Stage Procedure for Structural Estimation 
in Implicit Markets 
Perhaps the best starting point for a discussion of structural estimation 
in  hedonic price  models is Rosen’s (1974) article.  Although not  the 
earliest discussion of  the structural determinants of  observed hedonic 
price loci,  this article probably has been the most influential, and it 
provides a useful context for the discussion to follow.’ 
In his 1974 article, Rosen considered the relation between the “he- 
donic” price equations that many researchers had estimated for various 
commodities (see, e.g., Griliches 1971) and the structural demand and 
supply functions for “characteristics”  that in principle had generated 
those hedonic price loci. The fundamental question addressed by Rosen 
was the following: Given that one observes an empirical relation between 
the price of some product, P, and the vector of characteristics embodied 
by that product, 2,  what structural interpretation can one attach to this 
relation? In particular, how is such a relation generated by and related to 
the underlying distributions of  tastes and technologies among market 
participants, and can the parameters that characterize those tastes and 
technologies and their distributions be derived from knowledge of  the 
P(2)  locus itself? 
In answering this question, Rosen emphasized two basic points: first, 
any observed P(2)  locus, being a joint envelope of  (compensated) mar- 
ginal bid and offer functions for buyers and sellers, will not generally 
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offer  functions from which it is  generated;  and second, as a general 
matter, in the absence of  extreme simplifying assumptions regarding 
tastes, technologies, and the distributions of tastes and technologies, no 
simple analytic relation exists between the functional form and param- 
eters of  the P(2)  relation and the functional forms, parameters,  and 
distributions of consumers’ tastes and producers’ technologies-thus  pre- 
cluding any analytically based inference about structural equations and 
parameters simply from observations on a P(Z)  locus alone.’O 
For those interested in recovering the structural compensated demand 
and supply parameters underlying observed hedonic price loci, these two 
results offered little encouragement. However, as a by-product of  his 
analysis, Rosen was also led to suggest a two-stage empirical procedure 
for estimating the structural parameters underlying observed hedonic 
price loci that did not require the derivation of an exact analytical relation 
between the structural parameters of  interest and the observed market 
locus parameters. 
Following Rosen’s presentation of  this procedure, assume that con- 
sumers’ marginal willingness to pay for characteristic Zi is some function 
I$(.) of a vector of characteristics, 2,  as well as a vector of exogenous shift 
variables, Yl.  Similarly, assume that the marginal supply price of  Zi is 
some function  Gi(Zi,  Y2),  where  Y, denotes a vector  of  exogenous 
variables shifting supply. Lettingpi(2)  denote the implicit marginal price 
for attribute Zi,  the tangency of compensated bid and offer functions at 
each level of  characteristic Zi implies the following model for the data 
(ignoring random terms): 
(1)  pi(Z)  = 4(2,  Y,)  (demand), 
(2)  pi(z)  = Gi(Z,  y2)  (supply)  7 
for which Rosen (1974) suggested the following estimating procedure: 
First, estimate P(2)  by the usual hedonic method, without regard to Yl 
and Y2.  That is, regress observed differentiated products’ prices, P, on 
all their characteristics, 2, using the best-fitting functional form. This 
econometrically duplicates the information acquired by agents in the 
market, on the basis of  which they make their decisions. Denote the 
resulting estimate of the function P(2)  by P(2).  Next, compute a set of 
implicit marginal prices aP(Z)laZi  =  Oi(2)  for each buyer and seller, 
evaluated at the amounts of  characteristics (numerical values of 2) 
actually bought or sold, as the case may be. Finally, use estimated 
marginal prices pi(Z)  as endogenous variables in  the second-stage 
simultaneous estimation of  equations (1) and (2). Estimation of  mar- 
ginal prices plays the same role here as do direct observations on prices 
in  standard theory and converts the second-stage estimation into a 
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This procedure has since been applied by a steadily growing number of 
researchers,  but  although  several applications and discussions of  the 
procedure have now appeared, there seems still to be only limited recog- 
nition  of  the conditions  under  which the method  actually will  yield 
estimates of structural parameters. The following discussion elaborates 
on these conditions and the problems that may arise when these condi- 
tions are not met. 
3.3  The Role of Constructed Marginal Prices 
in Structural Estimation 
In his original statement of  the two-stage procedure, Rosen asserted 
that estimated marginal prices could play the same role in structural 
estimation that direct observations  on marginal prices would play,  if 
available. He went on to say that, as long as some sample variation in 
marginal attribute prices could be observed, the identifiability of  equa- 
tions (1) and (2) would be determined by the standard rank and order 
conditions applicable to any market for which direct observations on 
prices exist. Each of  these statements, however, requires qualification. 
Without  qualification, each statement could lead researchers applying 
the two-stage technique to misinterpret resulting estimates of structural 
parameters. 
Perhaps the most important thing to notice about equations (1)  and (2) 
is that they are only part of  a larger system of equations that also includes 
the equation used to define marginal prices. Consequently, when deter- 
mining whether the parameters of  equations (1) and (2) are identified, 
the rank and order conditions that must be considered are those that 
pertain to the entire three-equation system, and not just those that would 
pertain to equations (1) and (2) taken in isolation, as would be appropri- 
ate if  equations (1) and (2) described a series of  equilibria in separate, 
explicit markets for which direct observations on prices were available. 
The implication of  this fact is that structural parameters which might 
otherwise be identified may not be identified when constructed marginal 
prices are used in place of direct observations on marginal prices. This 
fact seems to  have gone unnoticed both by Rosen in his original statement 
of  the two-stage procedure and by some researchers who subsequently 
have applied the technique. Neglect of  this fact can lead to potentially 
serious  misinterpretation  of  empirical  estimates  and  in  some  cases 
appears to have done so." 
To illustrate the potential for such misinterpretation with an extreme 
case, suppose that the estimated first-stage equilibrium price locus for 
some implicit market is given by 
(3)  P(2)  =  gozi + l/Zg1z:, 128  James N. Brown 
so that the equilibrium marginal price function for Z in that market is 
estimated by 
(4)  pi(z)  =go+g1zi. 
Suppose further that the structural demand and supply equations to be 
estimated are given by 
(5)  pi(Z)  = a.  + alZi  + a2Y1  + ud  (demand), 
(6)  Pi(Z)  = bo + blZi + b,Y, + us  (supply), 
where  ud and us denote random components of  demand and supply, 
respectively.12 
Looking only at equations (5)  and (6) and interpreting them as if  they 
described a series of  equilibria in separate, explicit markets for which 
direct observations on prices were available, the parameters of  these 
supply and demand functions would appear to be identified. Unfortu- 
nately, however, when one recognizes the presence of  equation (4)  as 
well in the structural model of  this market, it  becomes clear that the 
parameters of  equations  (5)  and (6) are not  identified. Because the 
variable pi(Z)  must be replaced by p,(Z)  in the estimation of  equations 
(5) and (6), and because pi(Z)  is an exact linear function of  Zi,  observa- 
tions on these marginal “prices”  will not really provide any extra in- 
formation beyond that already contained in observed sample values of Zi. 
Indeed, it is easily verified that, as a result of this additional, mechanical 
dependence between marginal prices and observed values of  Zi,  estima- 
tion of equations (5)  and (6) using go +  gl  Zi  in place ofpi(Z)  will result in 
estimates of a.  and bo  that are both equal to go,  estimates of ul and bl that 
are both equal to  gl,  estimates of u2  and b2  that are both equal to zero, and 
values of  R2  equal to unity for either structural eq~ation.’~ 
More generally, in the presence of more than one characteristic, simi- 
lar results emerge. Again taking an extreme example, if  the estimated 





B(Z)  =  g1  z1  + %gll z:  +  g2z2  + 1/2g22z; +  g,,z122, 
so that the implicit marginal price for characteristic Zi were given by 
JqZ)  =  gi +  gjizi +  g12zj,  (j  # i), 
then estimation of the following  structural demand and supply equations: 
pi(z)  = aoi + a1izi + a2izj  + a3jYI + u:,  (i = 1, 2), 
pi(Z)  = boi + bljZi + bziZ, + b3iY2  +  UP, 
using Bi(Z)  instead of  direct observations on pi(Z)  would lead to the 




do1 = bo, = 21, 
dl1 =  bll =  211, 
d22 = b22 =  g22 , 
(ii)  802 = boz =  22, 
(v)  812 =  821 =  b2l =  b12 =  g12, 
(Vi)  R2  = 1  for either structural eq~ati0n.l~ 
In this case, again, due to the presence of a third equation creating an 
exact link between marginal prices and observed values of  Z, second- 
stage “structural” estimation would only reproduce first-stage estimated 
parameters. 
It is worth emphasizing that results (i)-(v)  would be obtained regard- 
less of  whether  the  researcher  used  ordinary least  squares or some 
instrumental variables technique in attempting to estimate the structural 
supply and demand curves. Fundamentally, this problem arises from the 
exact, definitional dependence of the variable ei  on the set of regressors 
included in the structural equation to be estimated. As long as this exact 
dependence  were  present,  the  extreme  results  listed  above  would 
persist.  l5 
The previous simple examples illustrate the potential for the use of 
constructed marginal prices to yield nonsense results in some cases. In 
extreme cases such as these, however, it is unlikely that the researcher 
would be unaware of the problem, given the extreme symptoms that are 
present. Nevertheless, although such extreme cases are unlikely to go 
unnoticed in practice, they are worth recognizing for two reasons. 
First,  these  extreme  examples  emphasize  the  fact  that  structural 
estimation in implicit markets requires that marginal prices do more than 
simply vary-they  must vary in a manner that is not collinear with the 
variables included on the right-hand side of the structural equations to be 
estimated. This point deserves emphasis, for it implies restrictions on the 
set of structural equations that can be estimated in conjunction with any 
given estimated marginal price function. Moreover, because there will 
generally  be no guarantee that variables  appearing in the estimated 
marginal price function for some implicit market should not also appear 
in the structural equations for that market, these extreme examples also 
illustrate the fact that it may often be impossible to estimate correctly 
specified structural equations using constructed marginal prices.16 
Second, these extreme examples highlight the results toward which 
structural estimates may tend in less obvious cases, characterized by less 
than exact collinearity between constructed marginal prices and struc- 
tural  regressors. To explore these less obvious cases in more detail, 130  James N. Brown 
suppose now that the marginal price function defining oi(Z) includes 
some variable X not included in either of the structural equations to be 
estimated, so that the relevant three-equation system becomes 
In this case, the absence of exact collinearity betweenpi(Z) and the set of 
structural regressors will allow the extreme results illustrated above to be 
avoided. Nevertheless, the additional relation between marginal prices 
and attribute values given by equation (13) must still be accounted for in 
any structural estimation of  equations (11) and (12). Failure to do so 
could still result in the same sort of  problems that arose in the more 
extreme case of exact collinearity betweenpi(Z) and the set of structural 
regressors. 
To illustrate this point most simply, suppose that the parameter bl in 
equation (12) is effectively infinite, so that equations (11) and (13) can be 
treated as a self-contained system of equations, and consider the results 
of  estimating equation (11) by ordinary least squares. In this case, it is 
easily seen that ordinary least-squares estimation of  equation (1  1) using 
values of Bi(Z) constructed from equation (13) will result in estimates of 
al and a2 with the following probability limits: 
where pxyl  denotes the population correlation coefficient between X  and 
Yl,  pxu, denotes the population regression coefficient for X as a function 
of  Yl,  and 0% and  denote the population variances of  X  and ud, 
respectively.” As these expressions show, even in this simple case for 
which ordinary least-squares estimation of equation (11) would normally 
be appropriate, the manner in which marginal price observations are 
constructed will cause ordinary least-squares estimates of al and a2 to be 
biased toward gl and g2  pxyl, respectively. This bias will be more extreme 
as the ratio  -  Pkl)/ui  diminishes, with the extreme results initially 
discussed applying when  that ratio equals zero  (i.e.,  when  marginal 
attribute prices embody no variation that is uncorrelated with the set of 
structural regressors in the equation estimated). Analogous results apply 
for ordinary least-squares estimation of  bl and b2. 
As should be obvious, the existence of  a definitional relation linking 
pi(Z) and Zi contaminates ordinary least-squares  efforts to estimate 131  Structural Estimation in Implicit Markets 
behavioral relations between pi(Z)  and Zi.  Although this point seems 
obvious, it seems to have gone unnoticed in several discussions of  the 
two-stage procedure and in some applications of  that procedure as well. 
Freeman (1979)’ for example, has offered the following elaboration on 
the two-stage procedure as outlined above: 
There are three possibilities. First, if the supply of (commodities) with 
given bundles of  characteristics is perfectly elastic at the observed 
prices, then the implicit price function of a characteristic can be taken 
as exogenous to individuals. A regression of  observed levels of  the 
characteristic against the observed implicit prices . . . incomes, and 
other socioeconomic indicators of  individuals should identify the de- 
mand function. . . . 
Second, if  the available quantity of  each model is fixed, individuals 
can be viewed as bidding for fixed quantities of  models with given 
bundles of  characteristics.  A  regression  of  each  individual’s price 
against the quantity of the characteristic actually taken, incomes, and 
other variables should identify an inverse demand function. . . . 
Finally, if  both the quantities demanded and quantities supplied of 
characteristics  are  functions  of  prices,  a  simultaneous  equation 
approach can be used. (pp. 196-97) 
Following these suggestions in their empirical study of the demand for 
clean air, Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) assumed a completely inelastic 
supply curve for clean air at various residential sites and applied ordinary 
least squares in estimating the following inverse demand functions for 
reductions in air pollution as measured by nitrogen oxide content (table 
3.1). Harrison and Rubinfeld defined log (W), the “marginal willingness 
to pay,” as a constant plus the sum of  log(N0X) and the logarithm of 
median housing values. However, if  housing values are roughly propor- 
tional to income in Harrison and Rubinfeld’s sample, as may be sug- 
gested by the simple correlation of  .82 between median housing values 
and mean income in their data, the variable log(1NC) in Harrison and 
Rubinfeld’s demand equations may simply act as a proxy for the loga- 
rithm of  median housing values in the definition of  log(W). If  so, then 
Harrison and Rubinfeld may simply have reproduced their definition of 
log(  W). The suspicious pattern of Harrison and Rubinfeld’s coefficients 
suggests this possibility. 
Given the obvious problems that result from ordinary least-squares 
estimation of  structural equations in implicit markets, regardless of  the 
true underlying market structure, consider now the use of instrumental 
variables  in  the estimation of  structural supply and demand curves, 
assuming as before that estimated marginal prices contain some variation 
that is linearly independent of the regressors included in the structural 
equations to be estimated (as in equations [11]-[13]).  It is easily deter- 
mined that, due to the presence of Xin  the marginal price function given 132  James N.  Brown 
Table 3.1  Partial Listing of Harrison and Rubinfeld’s 
Estimated Inverse Demand Parameters 
Independent Variablesb 
Dependent  1%  1%  1%  Y1log  Y2log 
log(W) 
log(W) 
Variable”  Constant  (NOX)  (INC)  (PDU)  (NOX)  (NOX) 
-  -  -  1.08  .87  1.00 
1.05  .78  1.01  -  .24  -  - 
b(W)  2.20  .97  .80  -  .03  -  .07  - 
Source: Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978), p. 89. Observation units were census tracts. No 
standard errors were presented for these coefficient estimates, but  all coefficients were 
statistically nonzero at a .01 level of  significance. 
aW = marginal willingness  to pay, measured in dollars and calculated as a constant plus the 
sum of the logarithms of nitrogen oxide concentration and median value of owner-occupied 
homes for the corresponding census tract. 
bNOX = nitrogen oxide concentration in pphm; INC = household income in hundreds of 
dollars; PDU = persons per dwelling unit; Y,  = 1  when 95 s INC <  130,O  otherwise; Y,  = 
1 when INC 2 130, 0 otherwise. 
by equation (13), equations (11) and (12) are identified.19  In this case, 
therefore, application of some instrumental variables procedure should 
generate consistent estimates of  structural parameters. 
To  demonstrate this point, consider the two-stage least-squares estima- 
tors for the parameters ul  and u2 from the structural inverse demand 
function (11). These estimators can be viewed as deriving from a regres- 
sion of constructed marginal prices on Yl and on fitted values of Zi  taken 
from an auxiliary regression of  Zi  on Yl and Y2, and are given by 
where cov (pi,  Zi  I Yl)  denotes the sample partial covariance of  pi  with 
fitted values of  Zi,  holding Yl constant; var (Zi  1 Yl) denotes the sample 
partial variance of  fitted values of  Zi,  holding Yl constant; and cov (pi, 
Yl  I Zi)  and var (Yl  I Zi)  are defined analogously. Using the definition 
of Bi  from the estimated marginal price function (13), and expressing 
Zi  as  ko + kl  Yl + k2Y2, where  kl = cov (Zi,  Yl I Y2)/var (  Yl I Y2) and 
k2 = cov (Zi,  y2 I Yl)/var (yZ I Yl),  these estimators can be rewritten as 133  Structural Estimation in Implicit Markets 
where pxzi  I y1  denotes the estimated partial regression coefficient for X 
with respect to Zi,  holding Y, constant and using Y2  as an instrument for 
Zi;  and where  pxyl  I zi denotes the estimated partial regression coef- 
ficient for X with respect to Yl,  holding Zi  constant. 
Given the presence of gl  and g2  in these expressions, one might expect 
that instrumental variables estimates of a, and a2 would be biased by the 
use of constructed marginal prices, as was the case in the extreme exam- 
ples initially discussed. This expectation would not be correct, however. 
In interpreting the above estimators for a, and u2,  it is helpful to notice 
that for the system of equations given by 
(18)  pi = a0  + a,& + a,Y,, 
(19)  Pi=go+glzi+gzX, 
variations in Zi,  Y,,  and X  must be related according to the following 
equation: 
(20)  (a1 -  g1)AZj + azAY1 -  g2AX = 0. 
Thus, given any two  values of  the vector  (Zi,  X, Yl)  that  satisfied 
equations (18) and (19) and for which Yl remained constant, al could be 
derived from the relation 
Similarly, given any two values of  the vector (Zi,  X,  Yl)  that satisfied 
equations (18) and (19) and for which Zi remained constant, a2 could be 
derived from the relation 
Holding Yl  constant, equations (18) and (19) imply that marginal prices 
will vary (as measured by g2M)  as Zi varies only to the extent that al 
differs from g,. Thus, a, can be measured as differing from gl by the 
extent that marginal prices vary as Zi  varies, holding Yl constant. Simi- 
larly, holding Zi  constant, equations (18) and (19) imply that marginal 
prices will vary (as measured by g2AX)  as Y,  varies only to the extent that 
a2 differs from zero. Thus, a2 can be measured as differing from zero by 
the extent that marginal prices vary as Y,  varies, holding Zi constant. 
This reasoning clearly applies regardless of  whether one interprets 
equations (18) and (19) as deterministic or as stochastic. In the latter 
case, this reasoning provides the conceptual basis for the estimators given 
by equations (16) and (17). Although these estimators will be influenced 
by the definitional relation linking marginal prices and attribute levels, 
this influence has a legitimate theoretical interpretation. As long asgl and 134  James N. Brown 
g2 are consistent  estimates of  the true  equilibrium relation  between 
marginal prices and values of Zj  and X,  consistent estimation of ul and u2 
requires only that pxzi  I y1  and pxyl  I zi be estimated consistently. Given 
the structure of equations (11)-(13), moreover, it is clear that the use of 
Y2  as an instrument for Zj  in equation (11) would implicitly provide the 
consistent estimates of  pxzj I yl  and pxy,  I zi  required. Thus, conditional 
on the presence in the equilibrium marginal price function  of  some 
variable X that is not perfectly collinear with the set of structural regres- 
sors, and conditional on consistent estimates of the equilibrium marginal 
price function, the application of  instrumental variables procedures can 
generate  consistent  estimates  of  structural  parameters  in  implicit 
marketsz0 
To summarize  the results  of  this section, consistent estimation  of 
structural parameters in implicit markets is possible, and constructed 
marginal prices can play the same role in structural estimation that direct 
observations on marginal prices would play if  they were available, but 
only if  three conditions are met (in addition to the usual requirement that 
structural equations be correctly specified): First, constructed marginal 
prices  must  embody  some variation  that is orthogonal to the set  of 
structural  regressors  in the equation  estimated.  Second, constructed 
marginal prices must be consistent estimates of  true marginal prices. 
Third, constructed marginal attribute prices and observed attribute levels 
must be treated econometrically as jointly endogenous variables, regard- 
less of  the true underlying market structure.’l  The following sections 
elaborate on the first two of  these conditions. 
3.4  The Role of Cross-Market Data in Structural Estimation 
The  preceding  section  emphasized  the  requirement  for  structural 
estimation  that  constructed  marginal  prices  embody  some  variation 
orthogonal to the set of  structural regressors. Little was said, however, 
about the possible sources of  such variation. This section addresses that 
subject, focusing in particular on the assertion made by some researchers 
(see, e.g.,  G. Brown  and Mendelsohn  1980) that this variation must 
reflect differences across separate implicit markets in the marginal price 
functions facing market participants. It is argued here that structural 
identification in implicit markets does not necessarily require the pres- 
ence of  cross-market variation in marginal prices, although such cross- 
market variation will generally be preferable to an equivalent amount of 
within-market price variation, given the limited ability to test for spe- 
cification error with data taken from a single implicit market. 
To provide a context for the assertion that cross-market price variation 
is necessary for structural identification in implicit markets, consider the 
data requirements for the estimation of a demand function in a standard 
market model. Because only one price can be observed within a single 135  Structural Estimation in Implicit Markets 
market, it is clear that data from more than one market will be necessary 
to estimate any response of  quantity demanded to changes in prices. 
Given such multimarket data, the ideal experiment for identifymg the 
effect of price on quantity demanded might then involve a comparison of 
quantities demanded across several markets having identical demand 
curves (identical levels of  income, for example) but  different  supply 
curves and, consequently, different prices. In the absence of such an ideal 
data set, essentially the same sort of  comparison could be made statis- 
tically by  comparing  the  covariation  of  quantities and prices  that is 
orthogonal to income, for example, with the variation in prices that is 
orthogonal to income. 
Now, consider instead a single implicit market. Price variation can be 
observed within such a market, so it may appear that the same statisti- 
cal method can be applied within a single implicit market as is applied in 
the case of several separate explicit markets. However, the price varia- 
tion observed within a single implicit market, unlike the price variation 
observed across separate explicit markets, cannot possibly be exogenous 
to shifts in the demand curves being estimated, since marginal prices 
within a single implicit market can vary across consumers only if  demand 
curves vary across consumers. Thus, although one might observe varia- 
tion in marginal prices and quantities demanded within a single implicit 
market, such variation does not clearly correspond to the basic concep- 
tual experiment underlying the estimation of demand curves in standard 
markets. It is therefore not clear that making use of this variation just as 
one would  for  a  set  of  ordinary markets will  yield  coefficients with 
structural content. 
This behavioral  endogeneity of  marginal prices at the level of  the 
individual market participant has led some researchers to assert that data 
from a single implicit market cannot be sufficient to estimate structural 
demand and supply parameters. G. Brown and Mendelsohn (1980), for 
example, state that 
data from a single market, producing necessarily one set of prices, are 
inadequate for estimating the demand functions for characteristics. 
Each consumer faces the same relative prices of characteristics in one 
market so no demand function can be estimated. . . . To estimate 
demand, variation in the price at each level is necessary. . . .  The way to 
obtain suitable price variations is clear, if  tedious.  Each location is 
regarded as a separate market. Price variations across markets form 
the essential ingredients for estimating demand functions for charac- 
teristics, along with associated quantities of  characteristics and other 
socioeconomic demand determinants. (pp. 3-4) 
The analysis of the previous section, however, suggests that this assertion 
may be incorrect, since there appeared in that analysis no obvious re- 
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To investigate this issue, consider a single implicit market for which the 
underlying structural inverse supply and demand functions are given by 
equations (11) and (12). Suppose further that for this market the equilib- 
rium sorting of buyers and sellers leads to an equilibrium marginal price 
function that can be written as 
where u is a zero-mean disturbance term uncorrelated with all variables 
except Yl and Y2.22 
In this case, it is easily seen that structural estimation using the two- 
stage procedure would not be possible with data from only this market. 
As discussed earlier, the estimated equilibrium marginal price function 
must include some variable orthogonal to Zi, Yl,  and Y2 in order for 
structural estimation to be feasible, but given the present assumptions 
regarding  u, no  such  function could  be  estimated.  Thus,  structural 
estimation would not be possible with data taken from this one market 
alone. 
In contrast, suppose now that data are available from several such 
markets. In this case structural estimation may be possible if go and g, 
vary across markets.= In effect, the availability of  cross-market data 
allows market-specific dummy variables  to play  the role  of  X  in  an 
augmented  equilibrium  marginal  price  function,  and  these  market- 
specific dummy variables may have nonzero coefficients  in that function, 
even though no variable other than Zi has a nonzero coefficient within 
any single market. In cases such as this, multimarket data will be neces- 
sary and may be sufficient for structural estimation. 
Although necessary in some cases, however, cross-market data will not 
be necessary in all cases. To illustrate, consider the estimation of  equa- 
tion (1 l)  using data from a single implicit market in which X denotes the 
square of  Zi.  From a conceptual or sample design viewpoint, identifica- 
tion by this nonlinearity can be viewed as consistent with a hypothetical 
comparison of observed differences in quantities demanded and observed 
differences in marginal prices across pairs of  consumers with identical 
differences in quantities demanded at given marginal prices (i.e., iden- 
tical differences in Yl).  In order for this conceptual experiment to be 
valid, marginal price differences must vary across pairs of  consumers, 
and consumers must respond identically to differences in marginal prices, 
even though they implicitly  choose different levels of marginal prices. But 
these requirements amount to nothing more than the inclusion of 2: (or 
some higher order term) in the equilibrium marginal price function and 
exclusion of  Z: (or that higher order term) from the structural inverse 
demand function. Thus, as long as one can assume an equilibrium mar- 
ginal price function that is quadratic in Zj,  one can in principle estimate 
an inverse demand function that is linear in Zj  using data from a single 137  Structural Estimation in Implicit Markets 
implicit market. More generally, as long as one can assume an equilib- 
rium marginal price function that is of order m in Zi,  one can in principle 
estimate an inverse demand function that is of order m -  1  in Zi  using data 
from a single implicit market.24 
Nevertheless, although one can in principle estimate an inverse de- 
mand function of  order m -  1 in Zi by  first estimating an equilibrium 
marginal price function of order m in Zi, there is no guarantee that the 
data taken from any single market actually will support such estimation, 
either in the sense of generating a sufficiently nonzero coefficient on Zy 
in the estimated marginal price function, or in the sense of justifying the 
restriction that Z? be excluded from the inverse demand function. Fur- 
thermore,  the appropriateness of  this latter  restriction  can  never  be 
tested using data from a single market alone, since the inclusion of ZTon 
both sides of  the inverse demand function would then lead to the extreme 
results discussed earlier. 
It is in this regard that cross-market data will generally be preferable to 
single-market data. By allowing a broader set of structural equations to 
be estimated than would an equivalent amount of  within-market data, 
cross-market data provide a greater opportunity to test the restrictions on 
which structural estimation is based. However, although the opportunity 
for such testing is extended by the availability of cross-market data, and 
although cross-market data may allow the estimation of structural equa- 
tions that could not be estimated with single-market data, cross-market 
data  will  not  always be sufficient for  structural estimation, nor  will 
cross-market data allow statistical testing of  this sufficiency. 
To  demonstrate  that  cross-market  data  may  not  be  sufficient  for 
structural estimation in implicit markets,  one need  only note in the 
context of equations (ll),  (12), and (23) that if ao,  bo,  al,  and bl also vary 
across markets as go and gl  were assumed to vary, structural estimation 
again would be impossible, even with cross-market data.25  Moreover, as 
in  the case previously discussed, the researcher could never  test  the 
appropriateness of imposing constancy on these coefficients, since allow- 
ing them to vary in estimation would once again result in the extreme 
problems discussed initially. Thus, structural estimation, whether on the 
basis of  single-market or cross-market data, ultimately must rest on a 
priori restrictions that may not be met by the data and that cannot all be 
tested. Given this fact, it is worthwhile to consider the potential problems 
and consequences of specification error that may affect structural estima- 
tion in implicit markets. The following section addresses this issue. 
3.5  Specification Error in Implicit Markets 
In contrast to the case of  ordinary markets for which direct observa- 
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requires not only that structural equations be correctly specified, but also 
that the first-stage equation used to construct marginal price “observa- 
tions” itself be correctly specified. Because the estimated first-stage P(Z) 
function fundamentally determines the “data” on which second-stage 
structural estimation is based, any error made in the estimation of that 
function will generally be translated into errors in  the estimation  of 
structural equations. This point is surely not surprising, but it is especially 
important to emphasize in the context of  implicit markets, where theory 
provides little basis for the specification of either the first-stage market 
locus or the second-stage structural equations,  and where  the “con- 
structed” nature of  the dependent variable creates an inherent risk that 
second-stage structural estimation may only reproduce parameters of the 
estimated marginal price function. 
To illustrate some of  the problems of specification that are peculiar to 
structural estimation in implicit markets, consider the consequences that 
arise when  some variable  is incorrectly excluded from the estimated 
marginal price function for an implicit market. Suppose, for example, 
that the true equilibrium marginal price function for this market is given 
by 
but  that  the researcher  instead constructs  marginal prices  using the 
relation 
P,(Z)  =  go + g1  zi  + gzx, 
with the gi  derived from a first-stage regression of P on Zi,  Zf ,  and ZiX. 
Suppose further that the true structural equations for this market are 
those given by equations (11) and (12), and that the researcher estimates 
correctly specified versions of these equations. Finally, suppose that the 
omitted variable W is orthogonal to all variables in the structural supply 
and demand functions, so that its omission from  the marginal price 
function  does not  cause  any  direct  bias  in  estimated structural  pa- 
rameters. 
In this case, one might expect the omission of  W from the marginal 
price function (or, more precisely, the omission of the product of Zi  and 
W from the first-stage estimated P(2)  locus) not to induce bias in struc- 
tural estimates, since this “measurement error” would be confined to the 
dependent variable alone and would not be directly correlated with the 
variables included in the structural equations estimated. Nevertheless, 
because the  omission of ZiWfrom the estimated first-stage  P(2)  locus will 
generally lead to  inconsistent estimates of g, and g2,  and because errors in 
the estimation of  gl  and g2 will lead to “measurement errors” in the 
estimation of  pi that are correlated with Zi,  structural parameter esti- 
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structural equations themselves are correctly specified. In general, only if 
the product of Zi and W were orthogonal to the variables included in the 
first-stage estimated P(2)  locus, and W orthogonal to the instrumental 
variables used in estimating the structural demand and supply equations, 
would structural parameter estimates not be made inconsistent by such 
omission.26 
Alternatively, suppose again that the variable W is incorrectly omitted 
from the estimated marginal price function, but now suppose also that W 
is incorrectly included in the structural inverse demand function. In this 
case again, it is obvious that, because estimated coefficients in the mar- 
ginal price function will generally be made inconsistent by the exclusion 
of Wfrom that function (or, more precisely, by the exclusion of ZiWfrom 
the first-stage estimated P(Z)  locus), estimates of  ul  and u2 also will be 
made inconsistent by this exclusion. Furthermore, it is a straightforward 
matter to see that the resulting estimated structural coefficient for Win 
this case will be biased toward the coefficient for Win the true marginal 
price function.” Thus, even though W does not appropriately belong in 
the structural inverse demand function, it may appear statistically signifi- 
cant in that function, and the researcher may be given no warning that the 
inclusion of  W in the structural demand function is inappropriate,  as 
would generally be provided by  a low t-statistic if  the marginal price 
function were correctly specified. 
The potentially serious consequences of  incorrectly excluding some 
variable from the estimated marginal price function for an implicit mar- 
ket may appear to warrant the inclusion of possibly extraneous variables 
in that function. The incorrect inclusion of such variables, however, may 
also have potentially serious consequences. To illustrate this fact, sup- 
pose now that W no longer belongs in the true equilibrium marginal price 
function for the implicit market discussed above, but that W  is incorrectly 
included in the estimated version of  the marginal price function for that 
market. 
In this case, as before, even if  estimated structural equations are 
correctly specified, specification error in the marginal price function can 
lead  to  inconsistent  estimates  of  structural  parameters  by  way  of 
measurement error in the dependent variable that is correlated with the 
arguments of  the structural equations estimated. Unlike the case where 
W is incorrectly excluded from the estimated marginal price function, 
however, incorrect inclusion of W in the estimated marginal price func- 
tion will  cause inconsistent estimates of  correctly specified structural 
equations only if  W is correlated with the arguments of  those structural 
equations. Assuming that W truly is an extraneous variable, such incon- 
sistency would therefore appear to be unlikely. Nevertheless, given the 
ad hoc manner in which the estimated P(Z)  locus is usually specified, the 
possibility of  such bias should not be overlooked.28 140  James N. Brown 
Moreover, the potential consequences of incorrectly including Win the 
estimated marginal price function may become more serious when the 
estimated structural equations themselves are misspecified. Given that W 
has been incorrectly included in the estimated marginal price function, if 
W is  also incorrectedly  included in the estimated structural demand 
function, it can be seen that the estimated structural coefficient for Wwill 
be biased toward the coefficient for W in the estimated marginal price 
function, with exact quality holding when W is orthogonal to X, given Zi 
and Yl.*9  Thus, as before, the incorrect inclusion of an irrelevant variable 
in an estimated structural equation can result in statistically significant 
estimated structural coefficients  for that variable, and the researcher may 
be given no warning that such inclusion is inappropriate, as would gener- 
ally be provided by  a low t-statistic if  the marginal price function were 
correctly specified. 
As a final example, suppose again that the irrelevant variable W is 
incorrectly included in the estimated marginal price function, and sup- 
pose now that the variable X is incorrectly included in the structural 
demand equation. In this case, the presence of  Win the marginal price 
function and absence of Wfrom the structural demand function will allow 
estimates of al and u2 to be calculated, but given that W is an irrelevant 
variable, it can easily be shown that the estimated structural coefficients 
for Zi,  Y,  ,  and Xwill be biased toward the coefficients  for those variables 
in the marginal price function, with exact equality holding when W is 
orthogonal to the variables included in the structural demand and supply 
functions.30  Once again, misspecification may result in estimated struc- 
tural parameters that merely reflect estimated parameters of the marginal 
price function, and once again there may be no clear statistical evidence 
of  such misspecification. 
This last example is relevant  not only to cases in which structural 
equations have been misspecified, but also to cases in which correctly 
specified structural equations are not identified but  nonetheless esti- 
mated on the basis of  an extraneous variable included in the estimated 
equilibrium marginal price function. As this example indicates, the pres- 
ence of such bogus identification will generally result in estimated struc- 
tural  parameters that  mimic previously estimated parameters  of  the 
marginal price function. In cases where estimated structural parameters 
and estimated parameters of  the marginal price function appear to co- 
incide, therefore, one might be tempted to infer that such bogus iden- 
tification is present. Unfortunately, this inference would not be without 
risk, for it is always possible that the two sets of  parameters could be 
similar for legitimate reasons. Nevertheless, given the ex-post, curve- 
fitting nature of  the process by which first-stage specification generally 
occurs, an extra burden of proof might reasonably be expected to fall on 
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parameters appear to coincide. In such cases particularly, one should be 
wary that irrelevant variables or inappropriate variables have been in- 
cluded in both the first and second stages of  the estimation procedure. 
Considering the potential for structural parameter estimates to mimic 
first-stage locus parameter estimates when both the marginal price func- 
tion and structural demand or supply functions are misspecified, it is 
worth noting that, in many instances, the “structural” parameter esti- 
mates implied by such inadvertent reproduction of the equation used to 
construct marginal prices may be qualitatively similar to those implied by 
demand theory. For example, if one first estimates the market locus given 
by equation (7) and then uses equation (8) to construct marginal prices, 
inadvertent reproduction or near reproduction  of  equation (8) would 
lead to estimated demand curves that tended to display symmetry of 
cross-price effects and that also tended to display negative own-price 
effects for characteristics in which the estimated version of equation (7) 
was  concave.  This tendency  suggests that  one should interpret with 
caution studies that present negative estimated own-price effects and 
symmetry of  estimated cross-price effects as evidence that structural 
demand curves really have been estimated.” 
In this regard, consider the estimates reported by Witte, Sumka, and 
Erekson (1979, hereafter Witte et al.) in their application of  the two- 
stage procedure to the housing market.32  In their study, Witte et al. first 
estimated, for each of  four cities,  a  quadratic market  locus relating 
housing  values  to various  characteristics,  including dwelling quality, 
dwelling size, and lot size (see table 3.2). 
Using these estimates to construct marginal characteristic prices, Witte 
et al. then estimated a set of  linear (inverse) demand and supply func- 
tions, imposing constancy of  structural coefficients across markets (see 
table 3.3). 
Upon inspection, the following characteristics of  Witte et al.  ’s esti- 
mates become apparent. First, there is a general similarity in magnitude 
between estimated own-price effects on demand and on supply. In only 
two of the nine cases shown in table 3.3 are the two estimated effects not 
similar in magnitude.  Second, the estimates  in  table  3.3 display the 
symmetrical pattern implied by the equations used to construct estimated 
marginal prices. On the demand side this pattern might be explained by 
Slutsky symmetry, but on the supply side it seems unlikely that anything 
other than the method by which marginal prices were constructed can 
account for this pattern. Third, there is a general similarity in magnitude 
between the coefficients on squared values of  characteristics from the 
first-stage equation and Witte et al.’s estimated own-price effects on 
supply and demand from the second-stage estimation. In particular, there 
is a tendency for  to exceed 822,  which exceeds &33 (in absolute value), 
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Table 3.2  Partial Listing of Witte, Sumka, and Erekson’s 
Estimated Market Locus Parameters 
Estimated Parameters 
City  811 
Greenville  -  7.40 
(3.05) 
Kinston  8.53 
(6.75) 




822  833  812  813  823 
a  a  -3.23  0.65 
(1.21)  -  -  -  (0.27) 
(1.25)  (0.02)  (4.95)  (0.83)  (0.31) 
(1.41)  (0.01)  (2.29)  (0.24)  (0.10) 
-0.78  -0.001  -2.00  0.75  -0.17 
-0.40  -0.011  6.13  0.19  -0.05 
-  2.47  14.18 
a  a 
(1.02)  -  (3.94)  -  - 
Source:  J. Brown and H. Rosen (1981), p. 10. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
These estimates are based on an estimating equation of  the form 
where: R  denotes annual contract rent; Z1  denotes dwelling quality; Z2  denotes dwelling 
size; Z3  denotes lot size; Z, denotes neighborhood  quality; Z5 denotes accessibility; D1 
denotes a dummy variable  = 1 if  heat charges included in rent; D2  denotes a dummy 
variable  = 1 if  furnishings included in rent. 
”Witte  et al., excluded these variables because they did not add significantly to the explana- 
tory power of  the regression (see Witte et al., 1979, p. 1151, note 13). 
the coefficients in table 3.3 as one reads along the main diagonal from 
northwest to southeast. Similarly, Witte et al.’s estimated values of  tjI3 
tend to be small in absolute value, as do the estimated coefficients for Z3 
in the demand and supply equations for Z1,  and for Z1  in the demand and 
supply equations for Z3.  Finally, although not reproduced here, in only 
eight out of twenty-four cases were Witte et al.’s estimated coefficients  on 
demand and supply shift variables statistically nonzero at less than a .10 
level of  ~ignificance.~’  Thus, although one cannot reject the hypothesis 
that these estimates accurately reflect structural parameters, the patterns 
they display suggest that these estimates may reflect the construction of 
marginal prices more than they reflect any true market structure. 
The discussion in  this  section emphasizes the misinterpretation  of 
structural estimates that may result from specification error in implicit 
markets.  Like  structural  estimation  in  ordinary  markets,  structural 
estimation in implicit markets ultimately rests on a priori restrictions that 
may not be met by the data and that cannot all be tested. Nevertheless, 
certain types of  misspecification in implicit markets will result in struc- 
tural estimates that, through their similarity to estimated marginal price 
function parameters, offer  at least  circumstantial evidence that such 
misspecification is present. Given this fact, and given also the limited 
theoretical basis for identifying restrictions imposed in hedonic structural 
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Table 3.3  Partial Listing of Witte, Sumka, and Erekson’s 
Estimated Structural Parameters 
Independent Variables” 
~  ~_______ 
Dependent Variables  Z1  z2  23 
Demand price for Z,  -  8.65  5.00  0.41 
Supply price for Z1  11.08  7.83  -  0.74 
(4.78)  (4.63)  (0.36) 
(2.87)  (2.76)  (0.49) 
(2.49)  (2.41)  (0.19) 
Demand price for Z,  8.12  -6.97  0.41 
Supply price for Z,  6.41  -0.71  0.28 
(1.16)  (1.12)  (0.20) 
(0.19)  (0.19)  (0.01) 
Supply price for Z3  0.12  -0.02  0.01 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.02) 
Demand price for Z3  -  0.28  0.38  -0.03 
Source: J. Brown and H. Rosen (1981), p. 9. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
’Z1 = dwelling quality; Z, = dwelling size; Z3 = lot size. 
plicit markets provide sufficient information to assess the likelihood of 
such misspecification. Of  the structural hedonic studies that have been 
carried out, however, few have provided such information. Considering 
the questions that have been raised in this section, one would hope that 
future structural studies of  implicit markets will not be similar in this 
regard. 
3.6  Summary and Conclusion 
Structural estimation in implicit markets differs from structural estima- 
tion  in  explicit markets  in  one fundamental respect: the  absence  of 
directly observed prices for the good implicitly  traded and the consequent 
presence in implicit markets of a third equation linking prices and quanti- 
ties, in addition to the usual demand and supply functions. Due to the 
required use of constructed marginal attribute prices in implicit markets, 
a complete description  of  the process by  which  “observed” data are 
generated in such markets must include this third equation. Failure to 
consider this third equation can lead the researcher to use inappropriate 
data or inappropriate statistical methods in the estimation of  structural 
parameters. 
The use of  constructed marginal attribute prices in implicit markets 
imposes additional restrictions on the research  methods required for 
structural estimation in implicit markets. Constructed marginal prices 
may play the same role in structural estimation that direct observations 144  James N. Brown 
on marginal prices would play if  they were available, but they will not 
necessarily play that role, and their ability to play that role is less general 
than many discussions and applications of the two-stage procedure might 
lead one to expect. 
First, constructed marginal prices must embody some variation that is 
orthogonal to the set of  regressors included in the structural equations 
estimated. This requirement applies to ordinary markets as well as im- 
plicit markets, but in ordinary markets with directly observed prices, the 
required variation can be purely random. In contrast, in implicit markets 
this variatim must be generated by  some observable variable not in- 
cluded in the set of structural regressors. Relative to the case of ordinary 
markets for which direct observations on prices are available, therefore, 
the requirement that constructed marginal prices not be perfectly col- 
linear with the set of  structural regressors limits the set of  structural 
equations that can be estimated in conjunction with any given equilib- 
rium marginal price function, and may require that estimated structural 
equations omit some variable that would not have to be omitted from 
those  equations  if  marginal  prices  were  directly observable.  Conse- 
quently, because there will generally be no guarantee that all variables 
included in the equilibrium marginal price function for some implicit 
market should not also appear in the underlying structural demand and 
supply functions for that market, there will generally be no guarantee 
that structural estimation using constructed marginal prices will not suffer 
from potentially serious omitted variables bias that would not be present 
if  marginal attribute prices were directly observable. Moreover, relative 
to the case of  ordinary markets, the researcher may have little opportu- 
nity to test statistically for the structural significance of omitted variables, 
since the inclusion of  these variables in the structural equations to be 
estimated could result in exact duplication of  the estimated marginal 
price function or near duplication of  that function, depending on the 
variables in question and the true underlying structure of  the implicit 
market studied. 
Second, constructed marginal prices must be treated as jointly endoge- 
nous with observed attribute levels in implicit markets, regardless of the 
true parameters of the structural equations estimated (except, of course, 
when one side of the market is characterized by complete homogeneity). 
In contrast to the case of  ordinary markets, therefore, the use of  con- 
structed marginal prices prevents the researcher from exploiting, for 
example, the assumption of vertical or horizontal structural demand or 
supply curves in order to identify parameters of interest. Consequently, 
structural parameters that might be identified in the context of  ordinary 
markets with directly observable prices might not be identified in the 
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Third, marginal attribute prices must be constructed without error if 
potentially serious misinterpretation of estimates is to be avoided. Unlike 
the case of ordinary markets, measurement error in the dependent vari- 
able cannot generally be  assumed to be uncorrelated with structural 
regressors. Consequently, such measurement error can generally be ex- 
pected to lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Incorrect exclusion or 
inclusion of  variables from the estimated marginal price function may 
lead to economically reasonable and statistically significant structural 
coefficients  for structurally irrelevant variables when structural equations 
have been misspecified. The use of constructed marginal prices therefore 
creates the inherent risk that structural estimation will be biased by the 
definitional relation linking marginal prices and observed attribute levels 
in a manner not statistically discernible to the researcher. Given this fact, 
structural estimates in implicit markets should be viewed with particular 
caution. 
Notes 
1. The standard reference in this area, of course, is Adam Smith’s statement that “the 
whole of  the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labor and stock 
must, in the same neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending toward 
equality”  (Smith 1937, p. 99). 
2. There are several studies of  labor market  data that interpret observed “hedonic” 
relationships  as structural on the basis of  an assumed  homogeneity  of  preferences  or 
technologies.  There are far fewer studies  (see, e.g., R. Smith  1974; Woodbury  1983; 
Atrostic 1982; and Sider 1981) that estimate structural equations  in a manner that allows for 
heterogeneity  on both sides of  the market. It is this latter type of  analysis to which the 
statement in the text refers. 
3.  A selective chronology of theoretical and methodological work relevant to the de- 
velopment of  structural analyses in implicit markets would include the following: A. Smith 
(1937); Court (1941); Roy (1950); Houthakker (1952); Tiebout (1956); Tinbergen (1956); 
Griliches (1961); Alonso (1964); Becker (1965); Lancaster  (1966); Muth  (1966); Lewis 
(1969); Griliches (1971);  S. Rosen (1974); Freeman (1974); Sattinger (1975); Lucas (1975); 
Epple (1980); J. Brown and H. Rosen (1981). Although several theoretical and empirical 
papers on the subject of  implicit markets were written prior to 1974, it was not until S. 
Rosen’s (1974) exposition that an empirical procedure for estimating structural demand and 
supply functions in implicit markets was clearly spelled out. 
4. In the urban economics literature, the technique has been applied by McDougall 
(1976) in estimating the demand for local school and police services; by  Harrison and 
Rubinfeld (1978) and Nelson (1978) in estimating demand and supply functions for clean 
air; and by Witte, Sumka, and Erekson (1979), Linneman (1980,1981), andBlomquist and 
Worley (1981) in estimating demand and supply functions for various housing and neighbor- 
hood attributes. 
5. On this subject, see R. Smith (1979), C. Brown (1980), and the papers cited therein. 
6. See, for example, Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) and Nelson (1978). 146  James N. Brown 
7. At the macrolevel, any evaluation of the potential effects of policies applied to entire 
markets would generally require knowledge of  structural parameters. Knowledge only of 
market equilibrium,  compensating  wage  loci would  not  be sufficient, since any policy 
applied  to entire markets would  generally  alter  those  loci in  a manner that could  be 
predicted only with knowledge of  those markets’ underlying structural demand and supply 
parameters, as well as the distributions of  tastes and technologies within those markets. 
At the microlevel, any assessment of the potential success of  efforts to alter the specific 
bundles of  job characteristics jointly chosen by workers and firms, whether by the monetary 
inducements of  taxes and subsidies or by imposed restrictions on quantities, would also 
require knowledge of the structural bid and offer functions for the relevant characteristics. 
In general, only with such knowledge could one predict  the likely substitution  among 
various job characteristics induced by those policies. 
8.  This procedure was discussed and applied also by A. M. Freeman in papers dating 
approximately from the time of  Rosen’s original contribution  (see, e.g., Freeman 1974, 
1979). 
9.  For an earlier paper on the subject of  equilibrium in implicit markets,  see Lewis 
(1969). For an analysis similar to and contemporary with Rosen’s, see Freeman (1974). 
10. The obvious exception to this statement, as noted by Rosen and Freeman, occurs 
when one side of the market is characterized by complete homogeneity, so that the observed 
P(2)  locus is equivalent to the compensated marginal bid or offer function for that side of 
the market. 
11. With the exceptionof the recent papers by Epple (1980) and J. Brown and H. Rosen 
(1981), I have found no explicit discussion of  this fact in the implicit markets literature. 
Moreover, at least two empirical applications of  the two-stage procedure (Harrison and 
Rubinfeld 1978; Witte, Sumka, and Erekson 1979) appear to suffer from misinterpretation 
due to neglect of  this fact. Several other studies may suffer from such misinterpretation, but 
the authors of  those studies present insufficient information for the reader to determine 
whether this is so. 
12. This example, along with the accompanying discussion, is taken from J. Brown and 
H. Rosen (1981). Harvey S. Rosen deserves equal credit for the points made here. 
It should be noted that the equilibrium price locus and marginal price function for an 
hedonic market will not generally be independent of  the structural  demand and supply 
functions underlying that market. Indeed, the distributions of  shift variables and random 
elements in the structural functions will, by way of  those functions and the condition of 
market equilibrium, fully determine the equilibrium price locus and marginal price func- 
tion. Thus, one cannot arbitrarily choose any set of  structural functions that might corre- 
spond to any given equilibrium price locus and marginal price function (and vice versa). 
Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no guarantee that structural functions such as (5) and 
(6) would appropriately correspond to equilibrium functions such as (3) and (4). Neverthe- 
less, for present purposes, this point need not be developed. The present discussion seeks 
only to explore the consequences of estimating, for whatever reason, equations (5) and (6) 
using marginal prices constructed according to equation (4). No claim is made here that such 
estimation would be generally appropriate. 
13. These results are easily demonstrated by considering first the ordinary least-squares 
estimator for the columnvector (aoalaz)’  from the regressionpi = Xu + u,  wherexdenotes 
the row vector (l,ZiY1).  This estimator is given by the familiar expression d = (X’X)-’ 
X’p,. Given that marginal price “observations” are constructed according to equation (4), 
this expression for a can be rewritten  as 6 = (X’X)-’X’Xg,  where g denotes the column 
vector  (go,g,,O)’,  Carrying out the multiplication, the result is that d = d.  Furthermore, 
because such a regression would simply reproduce an identity, the value of R2  correspond- 
ing to such a regression would necessarily be unity. Similar results apply for the estimation 
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To generalize this result, consider next the estimation of  equation (5) using two-stage 
least squares.  In this case, the estimator for the parameter vector a would be given by 
d = (XX)-'Xpi,whichcanberewrittenasci  = (Xk)-'&&,ord  = (A?'X,-'X(X+ e)g, 
where e denotes the vector of  residuals from the first-stage auxiliary regression of Xon a set 
of instrumental  variables, and where  is defined as  before. Noting that e must be orthogonal 
to the elements of X, the result that ci =  is once again derived. Unlike the case of ordinary 
least-squares estimation, however, the value of R2  corresponding to this estimated equation 
will not equal unity,  since X will  not match X perfectly.  Similar results apply for the 
estimation of  equation (6). 
14. The proof here is identical to that in note 13, with the obvious redefinition of X, 8, 
and g. 
15. See note 13 for a discussion of this point. 
16. In extreme cases such as those just discussed, it may appear that the researcher can 
always avoid the extreme results mentioned simply by including some additional variable in 
the estimated marginal price function. This solution may not always be possible, however, 
since there is no guarantee that the data will allow the inclusion of that variable to make any 
effective difference in constructed marginal prices. 
Because the use of  constructed marginal prices may require estimated structural equa- 
tions to exclude some variable that would not have to be excluded if  marginal prices were 
directly observable, the use of  constructed  marginal  prices may prevent  estimation of 
structural equations that could be estimated if direct observations on marginal prices were 
available. To elaborate, consider an implicit market for which the structural demand and 
supply functions are given by equations (11) and (12) and for which Yl and Yz are matched 
in  this  market  such  that  the  following  equilibrium  marginal  price  function  results: 
pt = go + g, Zj  + u. If  pi  were directly observable, and if  & and Y2  were not collinear, the 
matrix of reduced form coefficients for the system given by equations (11) and (12) would be 
nonsingular, and those equations would be identified. But given thatp, (or equivalently, u) 
is not observable, that matrix will be singular whenpi is used in place ofpi,  unless some other 
variable is included in the estimated marginal price function. It is entirely possible, how- 
ever, that u might be uncorrelated with all other variables. Thus, the lack of observability 
of  pz  may prevent the identification and estimation of  equations that would otherwise be 
identified. 
17. These expressions follow from application of  the standard expression for ordinary 
least-squares  bias in the presence  of  simultaneity.  See, for example,  Dhrymes  (1974), 
p. 168. 
18. It is unlikely that Harrison and Rubinfeld are alone in reporting biased estimates of 
structural parameters in implicit markets. Unfortunately, only one other structural hedonic 
study (Witte, Sumka, and Erekson 1974) presents sufficient information for the reader to 
assess the possibility of bias due to the use of constructed marginal prices. This other study is 
discussed in section 3.5. 
19. This statement follows from the fact that equations (11) and (12) each exclude two 
exogenous  variables  and include  two  endogenous  variables,  thus  satisfying the  order 
condition for identification, while the pattern of  the exclusion restrictions embodied  in 
equations (11)-(13)  allows the rank condition for equations (11) and (12) to be met as well. 
20.  As will be seen, differences in functional form between the equilibrium marginal 
price  function and the structural equation to be estimated  also can allow estimation of 
structural parameters. 
21.  This statement assumes that neither side of  the market is characterized by complete 
homogeneity. 
22.  The comments made in the second paragraph  of  note 12 apply here also. 
23.  As will be discussed, variation in go or g, across markets will allow identification of 
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In the absence of  such cross-market variation in structural parameters, cross-market varia- 
tion in the parameters of equilibrium marginal price functions may result from differences 
across markets in the joint distributions of  XI, K, ud,  and us. 
24. Noting that any function can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a polynomial of  a 
suitably chosen order, it is clear from this discussion that differences in functional form 
between the equilibrium marginal price function and the structural equation to be estimated 
also can allow estimation of  structural parameters. 
25. In this case, the interacted  set of  market-specific dummy variables implicitly in- 
cluded in pi  by way of cross-market variation in go and g, would also appear in the set of 
structural regressors, leading to the extreme results initially discussed. It should be noted, 
however, that if a.  and bo (oral and b,)  were constant across markets, variation ing, (org,) 
would allow identification of  structural parameters. 
26.  If  the  estimated marginal price  function were correctly specified,  the two-stage 
least-squares estimators for a, and u2 in this case would be given by 
and ril and ci,  would provide consistent estimates of  a,  and a2.  With the product of Z,  and W 
omitted from the first-stage estimated P(Z) locus, however, the resulting estimators for a, 
and a2 would be given by 
where g1  and gz  are derived from a first-stage regression that omits the product of Wand Z, 
from the estimated P(Z) locus. 
Upon comparison of  these expressions with those given above, it is clear that, in general, 
4,  and & will beconsistFnt for a, and a2 only if  W is orthogonal to Y,, given Y,,  and to Y,, 
given Y,;  and if 8,  and g2 are consistent for g, and g,.  In general, this latter condition will 
require that ZiW be orthogonal  to the variables included in the P(Z)  locus. 
27.  This result is most easily seen by considering the ordinary least-squares estimator for 
u3 in the “true” demand equation 
pi(Z) =ao + a,& + azYl + a3  W+ ud 
Given that the true marginal price function is equal to go + g,  Zi + g2X  + g3  W, but that the 
researcher has incorrectly specified p,(Z) as go + g,  Z, +  g,X,  the resulting regression of pi 
on Z,, K,  and W can be written as 
Assuming that a3 is truly zero, the ordinary least-squares estimate of  a3 will tend toward 
-g3 + (gz -  g2)pxwIy1,  yz, rather than zero. 
28.  Given that W has been incorrectly included in the estimated marginal price function, 
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where gl and g2 are derived from a first-stage regression that incorrectly includes the 
product of  Wand Z, in the estimated P(Z) locus. Assuming that ZiW is truly an extraneous 
variable in the first-stage estimated P(Z) locus, g3  will have a probability limit of zero, and& 
and gz will remain consistent estimators for the true marginal price function. Thus ti1 and riz 
will remain consistent for al and a2. Given the ad hoc nature in which the P(Z) locus is 
usually specified,  however, with W chosen on the basis of a nonzero estimated value of g3,  it 
is not unlikely that the final terms in these two expressions will be nonzero in any given 
sample. 
29.  In this case, the estimated coefficient for Win the structural inverse demand function 
will be given by 
1. 
cov(X, WIZ,,  Yl) 
var(W1 Zi,  Y,) 
g3 + gz[ 
Thus, although the true structural coefficient for W may be zero, the estimated structural 
coefficient for W will not generally be zero and will approach the coefficient for Win the 
marginal price function as the sample “effect” of  W on X, holding Z, and Yl constant, 
diminishes. 
It is worth noting that when W is incorrectly  included in a structural equation as well as in 
the estimated marginal price function, the incorrect inclusion of  Win the marginal price 
function will no longer affect the coefficient estimates for the other structural regressors. 
30.  In this case, the estimated structural coefficients for Z,, Yl,  and Xwill be given by 
In the event that the extraneous variable Wis uncorrelated with Yl,  Y2,  and X, when Yl,  Zz, 
and X are held constant, these estimators will reduce to 
4 =  g11 
ti2 = 0, 
(ix=g*. 
31.  See, for example, the papers by Harrison and Rubinfeld; Linneman; McDougall; 
32.  The following discussion is taken from J. Brown and H. Rosen (1981). Harvey S. 
33.  One would expect such coefficients to be  near zero if  Witte et al.  had  nearly 
Nelson; and Witte, Sumka, and Erekson cited in note 4. 
Rosen deserves equal credit for the points that follow. 
reproduced their marginal price function. 
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